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Summary 
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by 
allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their 
immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s 
history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, 
although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria 
and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed 
without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and 
the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only 
under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely, the 
level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its 
clustering coefficient as in other models. 
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Repeated games are frequently used to model repeated strategic interaction between im-
patient economic agents. Usually, it is possible to sustain equilibria that do not arise in
a one-shot game by repeating it. The associated payo⁄ vectors, moreover, can be Pareto
superior to the ones achieved in all stage game equilibria. The well-known Folk Theorem
states this result. This paper focuses on in￿nitely repeated discounted games for which
Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007), thereafter FLT, obtain the subgame-perfect
Folk Theorem. They dispose of any dimensionality condition previously imposed by Fu-
denberg and Maskin (1986) and by Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994), thereafter ADS, and
moreover, extend the result of Wen (1994) to (unobservable) mixed actions.
For simplicity, other strong assumptions are normally imposed, for example, that a
player observes his opponents￿behavior immediately and perfectly. To relax this assump-
tion is the aim of the imperfect monitoring literature, in which each player receives an
imperfect private or public signal of the action pro￿le played. Under certain conditions,
the set of sequential equilibria, or of other equilibrium concepts that extend subgame-
perfectness to repeated games of imperfect information, is usually non-empty. In some
cases even the Folk Theorem obtains. The interested reader is referred to a private mon-
itoring survey by Kandori (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson￿ s (2006) textbook.
The aim of this paper is to model delayed perfect monitoring by allocating the players,
that play an in￿nitely repeated discounted game, to a connected and undirected network.
In each period, a player observes his neighbors￿action choices and communicates non-
strategically, that is truthfully, these observations and other information he has received
before to all neighbors. The players thus take decisions under imperfect information in
any but the ￿rst period and the concept of sequential equilibrium is used. Nevertheless,
the entire history of the repeated game spreads gradually throughout the network over
time. The network gives a structure to this heterogeneous ￿ ow of information. It is also
possible, however, to interpret the delay in information transmission as being due to the
time it takes a player to process information or to react to new information.1
In reality, impatient economic agents frequently form a network due to which the
information ￿ ow is delayed. In many industries, such as the car industry, big producers
are at the center of a large network of suppliers, which may be linked among themselves.
Links are enforced by long-term contracts or relationships and high ￿nes are levied on
1The network is equivalent to a matrix of dimension "number of players" times "number of players", in
which each entry speci￿es the delay with which the corresponding two players obtain information about
each other. All results hold as well when this matrix is asymmetric, or equivalently, for directed networks.
2￿rms that break such a contract. (The ￿nes must be credibly enforceable which motivates
the use of sequential equilibrium.) The network is usually organized along the value chain
and information about a ￿rm￿ s non-compliance with certain quality or service standards
spreads only slowly throughout the network until it reaches the center. In turn, the big
￿rm at the center of the network might communicate changes in quality requirements or
product speci￿cations to its suppliers. Sometimes it also imposes price reductions on their
products. The suppliers decide whether to accept the proposed changes and if or how to
enforce them on their suppliers, respectively. Information may thus ￿ ow back again to
the center, for example, when a small ￿rm in the network￿ s periphery threatens to either
accept a price reduction for its products and to go bankrupt thereafter or to continue
as before. The theoretical model developed in this paper encompasses some of the key
features just described, although it also abstracts from some of them. This model can be
applied in several other contexts, some of which are mentioned in the conclusion.
Under the assumption of truthtelling, the Folk Theorem extends to the delayed perfect
monitoring model, that is, any feasible and strictly individually rational payo⁄vector can
be supported by a sequential equilibrium strategy pro￿le when the players are su¢ ciently
patient. Then, they do not mind to receive the repeated game￿ s history of action pro￿les
gradually over time. However, for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the delay
in information transmission caused by the network may trigger a player￿ s deviation from
some previously agreed sequence of play. The reduction in the set of sequential equilibria
in comparison to the perfect monitoring case, which arises when players are impatient,
seems to re￿ ect many real situations well. Moreover, the concept of punishment reward
is adapted to the network case and in order to analyze a general class of games, no
restriction is imposed on the dimensionality of the payo⁄ space.2 As a consequence, the
introduction of strategic communication becomes more involved and the e⁄ective minmax
concept has to be used. This model also contributes to the network literature in which
the clustering coe¢ cient, or similar measures of local connectedness, usually determine
the level of cooperation sustainable in a network. Conversely, in this model, the network￿ s
diameter is decisive. The two measures are not related as is illustrated in an example.
The related literature can be roughly divided into three setups. In the ￿rst one, each
pair of neighbors in a network plays a bilateral repeated game. A player￿ s communication
and observations are restricted to his neighborhood as well, that is, they are also bilat-
eral. In the second group of models, all players play the same repeated game and a player
observes an imperfect private or public signal of the action pro￿le played, or a bilateral
2Whereas in a perfect monitoring model this assumption is purely technical and may be disposed of,
in this setup it makes a substantial di⁄erence due to the heterogeneity of the information ￿ ow.
3observation structure imposed by a network is assumed. Communication takes the form
of public announcements of past signal realizations or of own behavior in the past. Hence,
all players are informed about the repeated game￿ s history at the same time. All models
in this group, additionally, assume a full-dimensional payo⁄ space and allow for strategic
communication. Finally, a setup as in this paper is characterized by a bilateral commu-
nication and observation network in which all players play the same repeated game, but
never have to report their own action choices. Only Renault and Tomala (1998) also
derive a model with these characteristics.
Nevertheless, two papers from the second group are also important since they assume
a bilateral observation structure. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) study sequential
equilibria of in￿nitely repeated discounted games in which the players form a (not neces-
sarily connected) network. They assume that players publicly announce their own action
choices and observations made about their neighbors in a strategic way, that is, including
lies. When each group contains strictly more than two players unilateral deviations are
detectable, and hence, do not occur in equilibrium. In Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003)
this idea is extended. Since monitoring is costly, only one monitor is assigned to every
player. After an incompatible announcement, which in equilibrium does not occur, both
players are punished and the monitor is substituted. Renault and Tomala (1998), in turn,
show how to sustain uniform Nash Equilibria￿ which is a weaker concept than sequential
equilibrium￿ in ￿nitely and in￿nitely repeated undiscounted games when the players form
a 2-connected and directed graph. Since this implies that there are two distinct paths
between any pair of players, lies are prevented in equilibrium. In their model, however,
the payo⁄ accumulation stops during a communication phase and, as in Ben-Porath and
Kahneman (2003), the players, in general, do not receive the repeated game￿ s history.
The next section introduces notation and de￿nitions. In section 3, the features of the
model are demonstrated in an example. Section 4 is dedicated to derive two concepts, the
information sharing process and the punishment reward phase. Both are prerequisites
for the Folk Theorem, which is stated in section 5, along with conditions under which
impatient players deviate from a given sequence of action pro￿les. In the same section,
moreover, the model￿ s extension to strategic communication is discussed and how it re-
lates to the imperfect monitoring and the network literature, respectively. The model




Each player i in the ￿nite set of players I = f1;:::;ng has a ￿nite and non-empty set
of pure actions Ai; a pure action ai is an element of this set. The pure action space
of the stage game is A = ￿i2IAi; with generic element a; called pure action pro￿le.
To emphasize player i￿ s role, a is written as (ai;a￿i): For any non-empty set of players
S ￿ I; let AS = ￿i2SAi; and denote by aS an element of this set. Player i￿ s payo⁄
function is a mapping hi : A ! R; and the payo⁄ function h : A ! Rn assigns a payo⁄
vector to each pure action pro￿le. The stage game in normal form is then the tuple
G ￿ (I;(Ai)i2I;(hi)i2I): Finally, de￿ne the convex hull of the ￿nite set of payo⁄ vectors
corresponding to pure action pro￿les in G as co(G) = cofx 2 Rn j 9 a 2 A : h(a) = xg:
2.2 Network
The players in set I are the vertices of a network g; whose graph is de￿ned as (I;E);
where E ￿ I ￿ I denotes the set of links or edges between them. A directed link from
player i to player j is denoted by (i;j): Graph (I;E) is undirected, that is, for all i;j 2 I;
(i;j) if, and only if, (j;i): Given network g; a path between a pair of distinct players
i and j is de￿ned as a sequence of distinct players i1;:::;ir such that i1 = i; ir = j;
and (il￿1;il) 2 E; for all 1 < l ￿ r: Its length is r ￿ 1: Network g is assumed to be
connected. Hence, each player is connected to at least one other player directly and
to all others via paths of ￿nite lengths. The number of links along the shortest path
between two distinct players i and j is called distance between i and j and is denoted by
dij: Moreover, denote the largest distance between player i and any other player in the
network by di = max
j2I
dij; and de￿ne the diameter of network g as the maximal largest
distance among all players, that is, d = max
i2I
di: Finally, denote player i￿ s set of direct
neighbors by i(1) = fj 2 I j dij = 1g and, in general, for any 1 ￿ m ￿ di; de￿ne his set
of m-neighbors as i(m) = fj 2 I j dij = mg:
When the stage game is played repeatedly, in each period, a player ￿rst chooses an
action, in a way speci￿ed below, and then makes observations and communicates with his
neighbors. He observes the actions chosen by his immediate neighbors, before receiving
the information they received one period earlier from their neighbors. Similarly, he reveals
to any direct neighbor the action he plays, before communicating him the information he
received one period ago. Hence, information ￿ ows one link per period and with a di ￿ 1
5period lag, player i gets to know the repeated game￿ s entire history.3 It is assumed that
communication is non-strategic, or in other words, that players always truthfully reveal
what their neighbors did and told them. How to relax this assumption is discussed later.
Additionally, a player has perfect recall. Hence, for any player i 2 I at any t ￿ 1;
there is a set of observations, denoted by Obt
i; that includes all histories of observations
that player i may have made at the end of period t: It is de￿ned recursively as
Ob1













i(2) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ A
t￿di+1
i(di)
for all t ￿ di; where for any 1 ￿ m ￿ di and any t ￿ 1; At
i(m) = (￿j2i(m)Aj)t: An
observation made by player i at time t is denoted by obt
i 2 Obt
i: Given G and g; a sequence
of action pro￿les fatg1




























for all t ￿ di: At any 1 ￿ t < di; player i is not yet informed about the behavior of at
least one other player. At t = di; ob
di
i contains the actions chosen by all players in period
one. Abusing notation, this is referred to as a1 2 ob
di
i (since a1 belongs to A): At any
t > di; the action pro￿les a1;:::;at￿di+1 are identi￿ed by player i; and hence, in an abuse of
terminology, said to be elements of obt
i: Thus, at any t ￿ 1; the sequence of action pro￿les
generates an observation pro￿le obt 2 Obt; where Obt = ￿i2IObt
i: The players organized
in this way play an in￿nitely repeated discounted game.
2.3 Repeated Game with Delayed Perfect Monitoring
In the in￿nitely repeated discounted game played on the ￿xed network g; thereafter called
repeated network game, at each point in discrete time, t = 1;2;:::; the stage game G is
3At the end of any t ￿ di; for example, player i knows the actions played in period t by himself and
all players in i(1); the actions played by himself and all players in i(1) and i(2) at t ￿ 1;:::; and ￿nally
the actions played by all players at t ￿ di + 1 and at any point in time before.
4Equivalently, this setup can be interpreted as follows. Each action pro￿le at generates a public signal
with a delay of d ￿ 1 periods and certain private signals in all periods s; where t ￿ s < t + d ￿ 1:
6played. Set I is assumed to contain at least three players since otherwise the analysis of
the network case is trivial.
Let player i￿ s set of strategies be Fi = ffft
ig1
t=1 j f1




Aig: At any t ￿ 1; player i￿ s strategy fi = fft
ig1
t=1 prescribes him to choose some action.
For t > 1; this prescription is a mapping from his set of observations to his action set.
The cartesian product of all players￿strategy sets F = ￿i2IFi; constitutes the strategy
space of the repeated network game. A strategy pro￿le f = (f1;:::;fn) is an element
of F: To emphasize player i￿ s role, it is written as (fi;f￿i): At any t ￿ 1; each f 2 F
recursively generates a pure action pro￿le at(f) = (at
1(f);:::;at
n(f)) and a corresponding
observation pro￿le obt(f) = (obt
1(f);:::;obt






i(1)(f)); and for t > 1 given ob
t￿1








i(f) is de￿ned accordingly. Each f 2 F thus generates a sequence of action pro￿les
fat(f)g1
t=1; which in turn generates a sequence of observation pro￿les fobt(f)g1
t=1:
Given a common discount factor ￿ 2 [0;1); the function H￿ : F ! Rn assigns a payo⁄
vector to each strategy pro￿le of the repeated network game. Given f 2 F; player i￿ s pay-
o⁄, H￿
i (f) = (1￿￿)
P1
t=1 ￿
t￿1hi(at(f)); is the (1￿￿)-normalized discounted sum of stage
game payo⁄s. The repeated network game associated with stage game G; discount factor
￿ and network g is then de￿ned as the normal form game Gg;￿ ￿ (I;(Fi)i2I;(H￿
i )i2I):
When g is complete, i(1) = I n fig for all i 2 I and Gg;￿ is identical to the in￿nitely
repeated discounted game, referred to as G￿: In this case, fi simpli￿es: for any t > 1 it is
now a mapping from At￿1 = (￿i2IAi)t￿1 to Ai; that is, each player conditions his action
choice on the history of action pro￿les chosen by all players between periods 1 and t ￿ 1:
Moreover, the players have common knowledge of the game played, the form of the
network5 and the strategy choices available to all players. Finally and importantly, each
player i observes his payo⁄with a delay of di￿1 periods. This prevents him from deducing
other players￿behavior by observing his payo⁄. At any t ￿ di; however, player i knows
the action pro￿les played between periods 1 and t ￿ di + 1; and hence, he can calculate
or equivalently observe his payo⁄ for all these periods.
2.4 Payo⁄ Vectors Generated by Sequential Equilibria
2.4.1 Individual Rationality without a Full-Dimensional Payo⁄ Space
A player￿ s individually rational payo⁄ is the lowest payo⁄ to which he can be forced in a
stage game. It obtains when a player maximizes his payo⁄ while all others minimize it
5In most cases, common knowledge of the network is not required for the results obtained. I am very
grateful to Rann Smorodinsky who pointed this out to me.
7and is called minmax payo⁄. For any player i 2 I; the minmax payo⁄ in pure actions is
de￿ned as





ADS use the minmax payo⁄to de￿ne a player￿ s individually rational payo⁄in any re-
peated (network) game,6 in which the dimension of the payo⁄space is equal to the number
of players, or at most of one dimension less. They show that this dimensionality condition
holds whenever no two players have equivalent payo⁄functions in the corresponding stage
game. Such games ful￿ll the NEU-condition of non-equivalent utilities.7
Two distinct players i and j have equivalent utilities (EU), when one player￿ s payo⁄
function is a positive a¢ ne transformation of the other￿ s, that is, there are ￿ > 0 and
￿ 2 R such that for all a 2 A;
hi(a) = ￿hj(a) + ￿: (2)
This relation between EU-players i and j is denoted by i ￿ j: When (2) is violated
for two distinct players i and j; they have non-equivalent utilities, denoted by i ￿ j: The
EU-players are partitioned into U sets, S1;:::;SU; such that i ￿ j holds for all i;j 2 Su;
1 ￿ u ￿ U: Let S ￿ [u2USu; then i ￿ j holds for all i 2 Su; j 2 Su0 such that u 6= u0; and
for all i = 2 S; j 2 I n fig: Finally, assume that no player is universally indi⁄erent among
all action pro￿les, that is, for all i 2 I; there are a; a0 2 A such that hi(a) 6= hi(a0):
When a stage game does not ful￿ll the NEU-condition, that is, S 6= ;; a player￿ s
e⁄ective minmax payo⁄ is his individually rational payo⁄ in the corresponding repeated
(network) game. Following Wen (1994),8 the e⁄ective minmax payo⁄ in pure actions of
any player i 2 Su is de￿ned as
￿i ￿ min
a2A
maxfhi(aj;a￿j) j j 2 Su; aj 2 Ajg: (3)
In each EU-group, a reference player is selected whose maximization yields any member
of the group who is minimized the largest possible payo⁄. The e⁄ective minmax payo⁄of
6All results mentioned in this section extend without loss of generality to the repeated network game.
7Intuitively, two players have non-equivalent utilities when the projection of the payo⁄ space on the
corresponding two player plane yields an ellipse or a line with negative slope. Conversely, a positively-
sloped line arises when one player￿ s payo⁄ increases monotonically in the other￿ s. A stage game ful￿lls
the NEU-condition if there is no pair of players whose payo⁄ space is a positively-sloped line and at most
one for which it is a negatively-sloped line.
8Wen (1994) de￿nes the e⁄ective minmax concept in mixed actions, assuming however, that a player￿ s
deviation within the support of his mixed action is observable to the other players. For the general case,
which includes unobservable deviations from mixed actions, this concept is de￿ned by FLT.
8an EU-player, therefore, is larger than or equal to his minmax payo⁄, while for all other
players i = 2 S the two payo⁄s obviously are identical.
Denote the vector of e⁄ective minmax payo⁄s in pure actions by ￿; and the pure
action pro￿le forcing player i to his e⁄ective minmax payo⁄by ￿ ai: It is one solution to the
optimization problem on the right-hand-side of (3), on which the players agreed. Without
loss of generality the e⁄ective minmax payo⁄ of all players is normalized to 0, that is, for
all i 2 I; hi(￿ ai) ￿ 0: All players with equivalent utility to i￿ s obtain a payo⁄ of 0 as well
when he is forced to his e⁄ective minmax payo⁄.
In a perfect monitoring model, the decisions of all players in an EU-group are identical
since they are based on the same information, the commonly observed history of the
repeated game. Hence, one player could replace the entire group. Conversely, in the
repeated network game, each member of an EU-group chooses an action based on the
observations he made thus far, and usually, these do not coincide.
2.4.2 Set of Feasible and Strictly Individually Rational Payo⁄ Vectors
The set of feasible payo⁄ vectors of the repeated (network) game is de￿ned as
F = fx 2 Rn j 9 fatg1





Following Sorin (1986) and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), any payo⁄ vector in
co(G) is feasible for ￿ 2 (1 ￿ 1
z;1); where z is the number of vertices of co(G): For any
discount factor in this range, the sets F and co(G) coincide. Moreover, any feasible payo⁄
vector is achievable by a sequence of pure action pro￿les in the repeated (network) game.
The set of feasible and strictly individually rational payo⁄ vectors is denoted by F￿:
It contains all feasible payo⁄ vectors that are larger than ￿ = (0;:::;0) and is de￿ned as
F￿ = F \ fx 2 Rn j x > ￿g:
Any payo⁄ vector in this set is a candidate to be supported by a sequential equilibrium.
2.4.3 Sequential Equilibrium
Kreps and Wilson￿ s (1982) concept of sequential equilibrium requires a strategy pro￿le and
a system of beliefs to be sequentially rational and consistent, respectively. In the repeated
network game, the attention is restricted to a class of strategy pro￿les in which each player
conditions his action choices only on his observations￿ he believes what he observes. In
this class, each sequential equilibrium strategy pro￿le is sequentially rational for any belief
9a player may have about the yet unobserved actions chosen by all other players in the most
recent periods. Hence, beliefs are not modelled explicitly and a sequential equilibrium is
said to exist when the condition of sequential rationality is ful￿lled.
De￿nition 1. A strategy pro￿le _ f 2 F is a sequential equilibrium of Gg;￿; if for all t ￿ 1
and given any obt 2 Obt; f _ f￿(ob￿￿1)g1










When g is complete this de￿nition includes G￿ and the concepts of sequential and
subgame-perfect equilibrium coincide. However, equilibria of Gg;￿ and G￿ are called se-
quential when De￿nition 1 is satis￿ed, and the corresponding sets of sequential equilibrium
strategy pro￿les are denoted by SE(Gg;￿) and SE(G￿); respectively. A strategy pro￿le
is a sequential equilibrium if, and only if, any player￿ s ￿nite unilateral deviation at any
point in time is not pro￿table.9
3 The Network makes a di⁄erence
The following example illustrates how imposing a network on a set of players may a⁄ect
the set of sequential equilibria of a repeated game. Let ^ G = (I;A;h) be a generalized
Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game, where n > 2: At each point in time, a player chooses between
two pure actions: C which stands for cooperate and D which stands for defect. The payo⁄
function of any player i 2 I is de￿ned as follows: for each a 2 A;
hi(a) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
3 if aj = C; 8 j 2 I
0 if ai = C and 9 j 2 I n fig s.t. aj = D
4 if ai = D and aj = C; 8 j 2 I n fig
2 if ai = D; 9 j 2 I n fig s.t. aj = D and 9 l 2 I n fi;jg s.t. al = C
1 if aj = D; 8 j 2 I:
The unique Nash Equilibrium of stage game ^ G is the action pro￿le in which all players
choose D; since it is a strictly dominant action. In the repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma,
however, it is possible to sustain strategy pro￿les that yield a higher payo⁄ to all players
and are sequential equilibria under certain conditions, such as the trigger strategy pro￿le.
It prescribes each player to cooperate as long as all other players cooperate and to defect
9Since ￿ < 1; a player￿ s gain from a deviation of in￿nite length can be approximated by that of a ￿nite
deviation. Therefore, unilateral deviations of ￿nite length from a strategy pro￿le are not pro￿table if,
and only if, it is a sequential equilibrium of the repeated network game (Mailath and Samuelson (2006)).
101￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ 3
Figure 1: Three players form a Star
forever if any other player defected. Given any network g; the trigger strategy of player
i; denoted by ^ fi 2 Fi; is de￿ned as follows: ^ f1








D if 9 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ t such that for a￿ 2 obt
i; a￿
j = D; while a￿
￿j = C
C otherwise.
Given ^ f 2 F; observe that for all i 2 I and all t ￿ 1; ￿rst at
i( ^ f) = C; and second,
obt
i( ^ f) is such that for all a￿
j 2 obt
i( ^ f); a￿
j = C as well for all 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ t and all j 2 I:
Hence, for all i 2 I; H￿
i ( ^ f) = (1 ￿ ￿)
P1
t=1 ￿




3.1 The Players form a Star
Consider a star with n = 3; where the graph of g is E = ((1;2);(2;1);(2;3);(3;2));
represented in Figure 1. (Figure 2 represents ^ G for n = 3; where player 1 chooses rows,
player 2 columns and player 3 matrices.) The trigger strategy pro￿le is a sequential
equilibrium of ^ Gg;￿ if, and only if, all players are patient enough, that is, ￿ is higher than
some threshold value. Then, none of them ever deviates. Corresponding conditions on ￿
must be found for the truncation of the repeated network Prisoner￿ s Dilemma after any
point in time, and therefore, given any observation pro￿le. However, to keep this example
simple, only unilateral deviations are considered, that is, simultaneous deviations of two or
more players, by convention, do not occur.10 Then, three classes of unilateral deviations
can be identi￿ed. Any deviation that may arise in the course of play can be uniquely
allocated to one class. The three classes are
1) initial unilateral deviations,
2) subsequent unilateral deviations (before the initial is known by all players), and
3) unilateral deviations when the punishment takes place.
Obviously, unilateral deviations during the punishment are not pro￿table since all
players play D: The resulting action pro￿le is the stage game Nash Equilibrium in strictly
dominant actions. Hence, every player plays his best-reply independently of g and of ￿:
10For example, player 1 in Figure 1 cannot distinguish between a unilateral deviation by 2 and a
multilateral (simultaneous) one by 2 and 3 until he knows the action pro￿le of the period in which 2




C 3, 3, 3 0, 4, 0
D 4, 0, 0 2, 2, 0
1-2 C D
C 0, 0, 4 0, 2, 2
D 2, 0, 2 1, 1, 1
Figure 2: Prisoner￿ s Dilemma for three players
For the same reason, no player can deviate pro￿tably from the trigger strategy pro￿le
in part 2. After a player￿ s initial deviation, he and any player who knows about it are
best-o⁄ to play D forever (rather than to deviate and to choose C at any point in time).
It remains to show that no player has a pro￿table unilateral deviation from the trigger
strategy pro￿le when all players play C: Given ￿; player 2 (who is directly observed by 1
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The value of 1
3 is not only the threshold value for player 2 in this example but also the
one for all players in a complete network. The network a⁄ects, however, the threshold
value of the remaining two players in this example. Given ￿; player 1 (and similarly 3)
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t￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿￿1;
which can be simpli￿ed to 2￿ + ￿
2 ￿ 1 ￿ 0: The only positive solution for ￿ in this
quadratic equation is approximately 0.414. Hence, in part 1 of the sequential equilibrium
12conditions the requirement on ￿; or the players￿patience, is higher in the star with three
players considered here than in a complete network. This is due to the one period delay
with which players 1 and 3 obtain information about each other￿ s action choice.
This example extends to the case where n > 3 and the players form a star. The player
at the center of the star has the same role as player 2 in this example, and for all other
players the same conditions apply as for players 1 and 3 in this example.
3.2 The Repeated Prisoner￿ s Dilemma Played in any Network
A similar result can be derived for any network. Suppose that n > 3 and that all players
in a network follow the trigger strategy pro￿le. Then, an analogous calculation to the
one for players 1 and 3 in the above example yields a condition such that no player i 2 I
deviates. The corresponding expression is 2￿ + ￿
di ￿ 1 ￿ 0: Although it depends on di;
even in very large networks the threshold value for ￿ is bounded above by 1
2: Hence, for
"moderately patient" players, the trigger strategy pro￿le is a sequential equilibrium in
any repeated network Prisoner￿ s Dilemma when there are no multilateral deviations.
Another general result for the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma as de￿ned before can be obtained￿
still abstracting from multilateral deviations. Given g and ￿; it is possible to determine
for any sequence of action pro￿les, and not only the one generated by the trigger strategy
pro￿le, whether it can be supported by a sequential equilibrium strategy pro￿le. The key
step is to calculate each player￿ s worst payo⁄ which he can ensure himself by playing D
forever from any point in time on. A player￿ s worst payo⁄ is determined by the largest
distance between him and any other player in the network. This is the time it takes until
all players punish him, thereby best-replying to his deviation. It also depends on the
sequence of action pro￿les played by the other players until they are informed about his
deviation. A given sequence of action pro￿les can be generated by a sequential equilibrium
strategy pro￿le, if it yields each player at any point in time a continuation payo⁄ that is
larger than the player￿ s corresponding worst payo⁄ at that point in time.
It is possible to calculate an upper and a lower bound to a player￿ s worst payo⁄. For
any f 2 SE( ^ Gg;￿); the worst payo⁄ of any player i in the repeated network Prisoner￿ s
Dilemma lies between the two identi￿ed bounds. The lower bound is identical to player i￿ s
(e⁄ective) minmax payo⁄ ￿ ￿i = 1: (The two concepts coincide in the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
since it ful￿lls the NEU-condition.) It is obtained when all players play D forever after
his deviation (and it is independent of the network and the discount factor). The upper
bound depends on a player￿ s position in the network and on the discount factor. It is
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Figure 3: Upper bound of a player￿ s worst payo⁄ in the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma
most since all players play C until they become aware of his deviation.
The trigger strategy pro￿le ^ f 2 F generates a sequence of action pro￿les such that for
all i 2 I and any t ￿ 1; at
i( ^ f) = C: After deviating unilaterally player i receives
(1 ￿ ￿)[2 + 2￿ + ￿￿￿ + 2￿
di￿2 + 1￿












This upper bound of a player￿ s worst payo⁄ is strictly larger than 1, unless the network
is complete, that is, di = 1 for all players. For di⁄erent values of ￿ and depending on a
player￿ s position in the network it lies between 1 and 2, as depicted in Figure 3. For small
values of ￿; it is close to 2 even when player i￿ s largest distance is small. Conversely, for ￿
close to 1, the upper bound of a player￿ s worst payo⁄ is close to 1 even in large networks.
Hence, the network may reduce the set of discount factors for which a strategy pro￿le
is a sequential equilibrium, and moreover, for a given discount factor, the set of sequential
equilibrium strategy pro￿les and the corresponding set of payo⁄ vectors may be strictly
smaller in the repeated network game than in the version with complete network. The
next step is to extend this result to repeated network games based on any stage game.
144 Information Sharing and Punishment Reward
In general, the conditions for sequential equilibria are not as simple as in the repeated
network Prisoner￿ s Dilemma since the action pro￿le forcing a player to his e⁄ective minmax
payo⁄does not coincide with a stage game Nash Equilibrium in strictly dominant actions.
Hence, punishment is asymmetric and may be costly for some players. Additionally,
since multilateral deviations may occur, the players are assumed to wait until everyone
knows whether a deviation was uni- or multilateral. This allows, moreover, to coordinate
punishment. In this section both issues are dealt with starting with the second one.
Until all players in the network know about an initial deviation, they are required to
follow the sequence of action pro￿les, although the deviator may continue to deviate or
subsequent deviations by other players may occur. Once all players have identi￿ed the
initial deviator, they start to punish him. In case the initial deviation was multilateral,
however, the players ignore it.11 This phase of information transmission is called Infor-
mation Sharing Process (ISP): Note, that the ISP-payo⁄ is not normalized by (1 ￿ ￿):
De￿nition 2. Given f 2 F; the Information Sharing Process payo⁄ of player i following
an initial deviation in period t0 only is de￿ned as
ISP t0
i = hi(at0+1(f)) + ::: + ￿
d￿2hi(at0+d￿1(f)):
Note, that an action pro￿le is known by all players after d ￿ 1 periods. The ISP can
be extended easily to cover a deviation of ￿nite length by any player. Any subsequent
unilateral deviator with non-equivalent utility to the initial one starts a new ISP which,
however, may overlap with the ongoing one. Once every player has identi￿ed the last
deviator, he is forced to his e⁄ective minmax payo⁄ at least until his entire gain from
deviating is taken away or until another subsequent deviator is punished. All players
that contribute to the punishment may incur a loss in their own payo⁄ as long as it
lasts. Hence, punishment should be restricted to a minimal amount of time, and the
punishers should be rewarded thereafter. Obviously, the reward must not be bene￿cial
for the deviator￿ otherwise, the punishment would be reversed again.
Assume without loss of generality that all NEU-players occupy positions 1;:::;^ i in I;
and that thereafter all players in the distinct EU-groups S1 to SU follow. In analogy
to ADS, given any feasible and strictly individually rational target payo⁄ vector x 2 F￿;
for all NEU-players there are player-speci￿c punishment reward payo⁄vectors denoted by
11In this case, the limit of the players￿beliefs is as follows. A player believes that all others follow the
strategy pro￿le, unless he observes an initial deviation. Then, he either believes that it was unilateral or
multilateral or any average of both until knowing the truth. In equilibrium, any such belief is consistent.
15!1;:::;!
^ i: They can be achieved by sequences of pure action pro￿les and have the following
properties. For any player i = 2 S; xi > !i




that is, the i-th component of vector i is strictly smaller than that of any other one.
For EU-players the punishment reward phase is simpler. Some time after player i 2 Su
deviated, all members of Su are subjected to the same punishment reward since their
payo⁄s are equivalent to i￿ s. Hence, it is enough to de￿ne one punishment reward payo⁄
vector for each EU-group. A cascade of deviations by players in Su is prevented by
taking away the gain each of the deviators in this EU-group obtained, that is, by forcing
the players in Su to their e⁄ective minmax payo⁄ for a long enough amount of time.
Thereafter, the group￿ s punishment reward phase is played. Hence, for each group Su;
1 ￿ u ￿ U; there is one punishment reward payo⁄ vector !Su:
Given any target payo⁄ vector x 2 F￿; the punishment reward payo⁄ vectors
!1;:::;!
^ i;!S1;:::;!SU; have the following properties:
i) for all i = 2 S; xi > !i
i > 0;
and for any 1 ￿ u ￿ U and all i 2 Su; xi > !
Su
i > 0:




























The conditions in part i) are target payo⁄ vector domination and individual rational-
ity. The ones in part ii) ensure that a player is worst o⁄ during his or his EU-group￿ s
punishment reward phase, but that he can be rewarded otherwise.
The existence of the punishment reward payo⁄ vectors for any x 2 F￿ follows from
ADS, who construct them explicitly and give the following geometric interpretation,
graphically illustrated in Figure 4. For two distinct players i ￿ j; the projection of
the payo⁄ space on the corresponding two player plane yields an ellipse or a line (with
negative slope), whereas for all others it is a line (with positive slope). In the ￿rst case,
the smallest i- and j-coordinates on a ball with arbitrarily small radius " > 0 about the
target payo⁄ vector gives the payo⁄ that the corresponding player receives in his punish-
ment reward phase. In any other case, the EU-group￿ s punishment reward payo⁄vector is
the lowest point, in which the line and the "-ball about the target payo⁄vector intersect.




















Figure 4: Construction of Punishment Reward Payo⁄ Vectors for EU- and NEU-Players
5 The Results
5.1 Folk Theorem
As explained above, a strategy pro￿le in the repeated network game is a sequential equi-
librium if, and only if, given any observation pro￿le, no player￿ s unilateral deviation from
the continuation strategy pro￿le is pro￿table. Since each observation pro￿le that may
arise can be uniquely allocated to one of a small number of classes of observation pro￿les,
it is necessary and su¢ cient to show for each class that any player￿ s ￿nite unilateral de-
viation is not pro￿table. The outline and proof of the Folk Theorem (which can be found
in appendix A) adapt some arguments of ADS and Wen to the network case.
Theorem 1. Let G and g be given. Then, for all x 2 F￿; there is _ ￿ < 1 such that for
each ￿ 2 (_ ￿;1); there is a corresponding ~ f 2 F such that ~ f 2 SE(Gg;￿) and H￿( ~ f) = x:
Intuitively, strategy pro￿le ~ f prescribes the players to punish a unilateral deviator once
all of them know that he deviated at least until his entire gain is taken away. Thereafter,
his or his EU-group￿ s punishment reward phase is played. Given any observation pro￿le,
unilateral deviations from ~ f are not pro￿table when ￿ is close enough to 1. The Folk
Theorem can be proved as well, possibly even for lower discount factors than _ ￿; using
other strategy pro￿les, as discussed in the next subsection. However, most of them are
technically and intuitively more involved than ~ f:
Patient players in the network do not mind to obtain the history of the repeated game
gradually over time. Immediate punishment or punishment that sets in after a ￿nite
17delay are equivalently strong threats for the players in this case. In the limit, the network
speci￿c e⁄ects disappear and the same set of payo⁄vectors can be generated by sequential
equilibria in the repeated game and in its network version.
Corollary 1. Let G and g be given. Then, there is ￿ ￿ < 1 such that for all ￿ 2 (￿ ￿;1) and
all x 2 F￿; there are ~ f 2 SE(Gg;￿) and ￿ f 2 SE(G￿) such that fat( ~ f)g1
t=1 ￿ fat( ￿ f)g1
t=1;
and H￿( ~ f) = H￿( ￿ f) = x:
There is also a lower bound of the discount factor ￿; and the corollary holds as well
for all ￿ 2 [0;￿]: For this range of discount factors, only sequences of action pro￿les
that prescribe the in￿nite repetition of stage game Nash Equilibria can be supported by
sequential equilibria in both games. Another Folk Theorem follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Let G; g and f 2 F be given and assume there is ^ ￿ < 1 such that f 2
SE(Gg;^ ￿): Then, for all ￿ 2 [^ ￿;1); f 2 SE(Gg;￿) and H￿(f) > 0:
Since network g is assumed to be undirected, a simple structure on the information
transmission obtains. As already hinted in the introduction, however, the players may
not be able to obtain information about each other simultaneously. The Folk Theorem
extends to repeated games played on directed networks that are connected since each
player still gets to know the repeated game￿ s history with a ￿nite delay. Apart from
this, the observation and the communication network may not coincide. A player may
observe a neighbor, though he may not be able to communicate with him. Denote by
(I;EOb) and (I;ECom) the observation and the communication graph of the observation
network gOb and the communication network gCom; respectively. The two graphs are
de￿ned as (I;E): However, both may be directed and ful￿ll the following connectedness
property. Each player is observed by at least one other player. The players communicate
their observations via a directed network gCom such that all of them obtain the repeated
network game￿ s history after a ￿nite delay.12 For any network gOC; consisting of an
observation network gOb and a communication network gCom; the Folk Theorem holds.
Corollary 3. Let G and gOC be given. Then, for all x 2 F￿; there is ￿ ￿ < 1 such that for
each ￿ 2 (￿ ￿;1); there is a corresponding ￿ f 2 F such that ￿ f 2 SE(GgOC;￿) and H￿( ￿ f) = x:
Finally, note that for a given set of players the network in which the delay after which
punishment starts is largest in a tree, that is, a line of length n ￿ 1: In this case, the
diameter among all networks that can be formed from the set of players is maximal.
Given G; let ^ g be an arbitrary tree network formed by the players in set I: Then, the
following corollary follows from Theorem 1.
12I am very grateful to Elchanan Ben-Porath who suggested the idea of two separate networks.
18Corollary 4. Let G; ^ g and f 2 F be given. Assume that f 2 SE(G^ g;￿) for all ￿ 2 (^ ￿;1):
Then, for any g formed by set I and all ￿ 2 (^ ￿;1); f 2 SE(Gg;￿) and H￿(f) > 0:
In other networks than trees the diameter is lower, and hence also the requirement
on the players￿level of patience. In general, f may be a sequential equilibrium even for
lower discount factors when the players form any other network than a tree.
5.2 Impatient Players
For impatient players, or in other words, for a range of discount factors strictly below
1, the network may make a di⁄erence. For the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma this was shown in
section 3 abstracting, however, from multilateral deviations. The aim in this section is
to derive a similar result for any stage game, any network and including multilateral
deviations. Ideally, it should state that for all discount factors larger than ￿; identi￿ed
after Corollary 1, and smaller than or equal to _ ￿; identi￿ed in the Folk Theorem, the set of
payo⁄ vectors generated by sequential equilibria in the repeated game is a strict superset
to the corresponding payo⁄ set in its network version. However, as already mentioned,
the Folk Theorem may hold for lower discount factors than _ ￿ when other strategy pro￿les
than ~ f are used. To identify them allows to reduce the network￿ s e⁄ects in a repeated
game. Two pro￿les which achieve this are described. Under both, the players use the
information they receive earlier than under ~ f:
Given any network, a player can start to punish a deviator, for example, when he
knows the action pro￿le of the period, in which the deviation occurred. Until then, he
cannot rule out that the deviation was multilateral. Hence, with respect to any player i;
the time delay, with which the players can identify player i￿ s unilateral deviation, induces
a partition of the set of players such that all players in a group observe the action pro￿le
played in the period of i￿ s deviation with the same delay. After some initial delay, during
which i￿ s deviation is unpunished, the players which ￿rst identi￿ed i￿ s deviation start to
punish him. Since the network is connected the group of punishers, thereafter, grows
strictly in each period until it comprises all players, d periods after i￿ s deviation. At the
end of the previous period, all players know that the deviation occurred.
Alternatively, all players may immediately punish any deviating neighbor.13 In sub-
sequent periods the group of punishers grows strictly until it comprises all players. The
delay until this is the case is determined by the deviator￿ s largest distance. For at least
13Suppose S = ;; that i deviates at t0 from fatg1
t=1 and that any deviator is "minmaxed" immediately.
Then, at t0 +1; i￿ s payo⁄ is minai(1)2￿j2i(1)Aj maxai2Ai hi(ai;ai(1);a
t
0+1




case S 6= ;; an analogous condition can be found.
19one pair of players, this coincides with the network￿ s diameter (which is the maximal
largest distance between any pair of players). If a player becomes aware that the initial
deviation was multilateral, he resumes playing the sequence of action pro￿les.
In both cases, a consistent system of beliefs exists, for example, as described in footnote
11. To illustrate both ideas, consider a network whose graph is as depicted in Figure 1
and any stage game G: A unilateral deviation by player 1 (and similarly by player 3) is
immediately identi￿ed by player 2 since he also observes player 3￿ s action choice in the
period of player 1￿ s deviation. Hence, from the subsequent period on, player 2 punishes
player 1. Player 3 contributes to the punishment only from one period afterwards on.
In the repeated network game, the diameter of the network thus determines when
the group of punishers comprises all players. Only then, punishment can be as e⁄ective
as in a complete network already one period after the deviation. Hence, the threat of
punishment in any network is always equally or less strong than in a complete one.
A form of punishment which eliminates the deviator￿ s gain entirely but at the same
time minimizes the loss the punishers may incur remains to be determined. In general, this
is impossible without specifying the stage game, the network, the discount factor and the
sequence of action pro￿les, since it is not obvious, if it is better to "minmax" a deviator,
to start a punishment reward phase or some other sequence of action pro￿les. However,
in a sequential equilibrium strategy pro￿le, unilateral deviations cannot be ignored, and
hence, the time delay caused by the imposition of a network on a repeated game may
reduce the set of sequential equilibria. This is expressed formally in Corollary 5, which is
complementary to Corollary 1 and the condition stated thereafter.
Corollary 5. Let G and g be given. Then, there are 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1 such that for all
￿ 2 (￿; ￿ ￿]; ffat(f)g1
t=1 j f 2 SE(Gg;￿)g ￿ ffat( ￿ f)g1
t=1 j ￿ f 2 SE(G￿)g:
When the network is complete, the lower and upper bound of ￿ coincide and the
corollary is trivially true. Otherwise, it is easily proved by induction with the arguments
given above. The interplay between the delay in information transmission caused by the
network and the patience of a player may reduce the set of sequential equilibria and the
corresponding payo⁄ set, although for large enough discount factors the Folk Theorem
holds. Comparative statics on g have similar e⁄ects on SE(Gg;￿); when due to the removal
or addition of a link the network￿ s diameter or some player￿ s largest distance changes.
Finally, formal conditions are identi￿ed under which the network reduces the set of
sequential equilibria for impatient players. Given G; ￿ and g; assume that ￿ f 2 SE(G￿)
and let f_ atg1
t=1 ￿ fat( ￿ f)g1
t=1: Say that the network has an impact with respect to ~ f; as
de￿ned in Theorem 1, if ~ f does not support f_ atg1
t=1 as a sequential equilibrium of Gg;￿:
20(Note, however, that this does not rule out that there is some other strategy pro￿le f 6= ~ f
such that f 2 SE(Gg;￿) and fat(f)g1
t=1 = f_ atg1
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by a deviation of length d ￿ 1 from f_ atg1







t￿￿￿1hi(_ at) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿
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for T ￿ 2d￿2: It takes d￿1 periods until all players know about i￿ s deviation, and 2d￿2
periods after it, all of them know if i deviated again one period before his punishment
started. An analogous expression can be obtained when i 2 S: Then, Proposition 1
identi￿es conditions under which the network has an impact with respect to ~ f.
Proposition 1. Let G; ￿ < 1 and g be given. Suppose there is ￿ f 2 SE(G￿); i 2 I and




i(T): Then, the network has
an impact with respect to ~ f:
Appendix B contains the proof of Proposition 1. Intuitively, player i deviates from
f_ atg1
t=1; if the punishment threat prescribed by strategy pro￿le ~ f is discounted by too
much, and hence, it is not strong enough to prevent i￿ s deviation. Therefore, the strategy
pro￿le de￿ned in Theorem 1 does not support the sequence of action pro￿les f_ atg1
t=1 as a
sequential equilibrium of Gg;￿; and the network has an impact with respect to ~ f. Similar
conditions can be identi￿ed for any other strategy pro￿le than ~ f:
5.3 Strategic Communication and Related Literature
Although in certain cases strong social or legal norms may impose truthtelling on impa-
tient economic agents, this assumption should be relaxed. The players could either decide
whether to transmit information or not, or even lie. A player can be easily prevented from
stopping the information transmission by the threat to punish him as if he had deviated.
The second type of deviation, therefore, is more interesting but also more involved. In a
sequential equilibrium initial as well as subsequent deviations have to be prevented and
a sequence of di⁄erent liars and deviators may be di¢ cult to disentangle for a player.
To assume that players may lie is standard in the literature. Compte (1998) and Kan-
dori and Matsushima (1998), for example, model imperfect private monitoring in repeated
games (without network) as follows. Each player receives a distinct distorted private sig-
nal of the period￿ s action pro￿le. By publicly announcing these private observations every
21K > 0 periods, the players restore a public history on which they condition their action
choices and a Folk Theorem obtains. Without communication the players￿beliefs about
where in the game tree they are might diverge and some player￿ s pro￿table deviation may
be undetectable. Kandori (2003) uses a similar idea in the case of imperfect public moni-
toring in which all players observe the same imperfect signal of the period￿ s action pro￿le
and publicly announce their own action choices. Under strategic communication a Folk
Theorem obtains under weaker conditions than without communication.14 In all cases, a
payo⁄ transfer mechanism provides incentives for the players to make truthful announce-
ments. A player￿ s payo⁄increases or decreases depending on his announcement. A similar
mechanism induces the players in Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996 and 2003) to truth-
fully announce their own and any neighbor￿ s action choice publicly. These constructions
require a full-dimensional payo⁄ space which is even stronger than the NEU-condition.
In the repeated network game, the payo⁄ of an EU-group may have to be increased
and decreased at the same time under such a payo⁄transfer mechanism. This, however, is
impossible. The presence of EU-players may also create the following problem. Suppose
that two or three players that monitor each other belong to the same EU-group. Then,
cooperation immediately breaks down because all other players anticipate a sequence of
deviations by the EU-players which these will, obviously, not reveal when communicating
their mutual observations of each other. Since in this setup a player does not communicate
his own action choice, but only those of his neighbor(s), the problem can be solved by
isolating the EU-players. They would, for example, occupy the places of players 1 and 3
in the graph depicted in Figure 1, while a NEU-player would take player 2￿ s.15
Nevertheless, due to the bilateral communication structure, it is challenging to in-
troduce strategic communication to the repeated network game. Each player receives
di⁄erent information gradually over time, and hence, all players can never simultaneously
condition their action choices on the same (communicated) information. To prevent lies,
therefore, requires, apart from isolating the EU-players in a network, to adapt the pun-
ishment reward phase. In order not to tell the lie that another player deviated, for each
player i 2 I; let xi > !
j
i for all j = 2 S; and xi > !
Su
i for all Su: By lying a player makes him-
self worse o⁄ under this condition. To induce a player to truthfully reveal any neighbor￿ s
deviation, additionally, for all i 2 I; let !k
i > maxak2Ak hi(ak;at
￿k) for all k 2 i(1) with
k = 2 S and any t ￿ 1: The analogous condition must hold when k 2 S: Then, by tolerating
k￿ s deviation i is worse o⁄ than by reporting it. The information that k deviated ￿ ows
14The Folk Theorem under imperfect public monitoring without communication in Fudenberg, Levine
and Maskin (1994) holds if the public signal allows the players to statistically detect unilateral deviations.
15Cooperation can be sustained in any star as well when the player at the center has a constant payo⁄.
22throughout the network only, if this incentive constraint holds sequentially for all players
in k(1); k(2); and so on. Then, lies are unpro￿table for ￿ close enough to 1 and restricting
the players to initial deviations only. After a history that includes lies and deviations, the
construction of the punishment reward payo⁄ vectors may have to be revised in order to
maintain the incentives for truthtelling and complying with the strategy pro￿le.
However, this need not be the case. Consider the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma introduced in
section 3 and suppose that the players in any network follow the trigger strategy pro￿le
^ f: Given that ￿ is larger than the threshold value of 1
2; identi￿ed in subsection 3.2, no
player has an incentive to lie. If all players choose C; each player is prevented from
claiming that some other player deviated by the same condition which prevents him from
deviating. Once cooperation is destroyed, such claims are not pro￿table either. After
any history, moreover, a player cannot improve his payo⁄ by not reporting a deviation.
Hence, truthtelling is achieved endogenously in the example of section 3, which however
and as already mentioned, is a special case.
To allow for strategic communication is appealing for two reasons. First, imperfect
private monitoring, which so far is imposed exogenously in many models, could be made
endogenous in a general class of games. Instead of letting each player obtain a probabilisti-
cally determined amount of information, more realistically, this should depend on strategic
decisions of other players. Second, information asymmetries that arise in repeated strate-
gic interaction, such as hidden actions or hidden knowledge, could be modelled in this
way. Therefore, this seems a promising direction for further research.
5.4 Network Analysis
The result that in a repeated game played on a ￿xed network its diameter determines
whether cooperation is sustainable, for a given discount factor, is new to the network lit-
erature. Conversely, various results in this literature emphasize that cooperation depends
on the clustering coe¢ cient, which gives the ratio of triads or circles of three players in a
network relative to all possible combinations of three players in I: Whereas the diameter is
a global measure, the clustering coe¢ cient measures local connectedness. Its importance
in the network literature is due to two sociology papers. Granovetter (1973) de￿nes the
concept of strong links which exist, for example, between three friends when they form a
triad (or a circle). This facilitates cooperation since the three friends mutually observe
each other￿ s behavior. Coleman (1988), in turn, develops the concept of closures, which
are circles of connected people as well but not necessarily of size three.









Figure 5: a) two triads b) no triad
consider the two networks depicted in Figure 5; for both n = 6: The scales in part a)
has 7 links and two triads, whereas the wheel in part b) has 9 links and no triad. The
diameter of network a) is 3 and the one in part b) is 2. The clustering coe¢ cient of the
wheel is zero, whereas the scales￿ one is positive. Hence, the relationship between the
clustering coe¢ cient and the diameter in a network need not be monotonic. (Obviously,
other examples could be constructed in which the monotonic relation holds.)
Cooperation in the setup of this paper can be sustained more easily in network b).
Given any stage game, for a certain range of discount factors, there are sequential equi-
libria in network b) which generate sequences of action pro￿les that do not arise from
sequential equilibria in network a). (However, as the Folk Theorem implies, for patient
players this di⁄erence disappears.) Conversely, in the network literature, network a) would
fare much better in terms of sustaining cooperation than the one in part b) of Figure 5.
The importance of the clustering coe¢ cient is emphasized, for example, in Lippert
and Spagnolo (2005), who model relational contracts by letting each linked pair of players
play a bilateral repeated discounted Prisoner￿ s Dilemma until one player deviates, which
severs the link. They analyze di⁄erent informational setups, including a case in which
players can choose not to transmit information, and conclude that closures are crucial to
sustain cooperation, modelled in form of sequential equilibria. Another example is Vega-
Redondo, Marsili, and Slanina (2005), who let each linked pair of players play a bilateral
Prisoner￿ s Dilemma, in which the payo⁄s are stochastically decaying over time. A player
severs a link once his payo⁄ falls below some threshold, although as a consequence he is
punished by all mutual neighbors the two players have. However, a player can create new
links in each period. This yields a dynamic process whose parameter choice in￿ uences the
form of the network in the long-run. Both papers are examples of setups, in which the
repeated game played as well as the communication and observation process are bilateral.
Since usually a player￿ s payo⁄ depends not only on his and his neighbors￿decisions
but also on decisions of other players in the network, even if they are "far away", it seems
24realistic to consider repeated games played on a ￿xed network.16 The three papers most
closely related to this, however, also obtain that closures are decisive to sustain equilib-
ria. A crucial condition for Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) to sustain a sequential
equilibrium in their repeated game with public announcements is that there are at least
three players in each group. Then, any liar can be detected in equilibrium. This is ex-
actly identical to strong links. In their paper with costly monitoring, Ben-Porath and
Kahneman (2003) require a similar condition to hold. In Renault and Tomala (1998), in
which strategic communication includes lying as well, cooperation can be sustained only
in networks that are 2-connected. Intuitively, this requires two distinct paths to exist
between any pair of players and is just the formal description of a closure.
The delayed perfect monitoring model yields a di⁄erent result since it assumes bilat-
eral communication. Players become informed about the repeated network game￿ s history
gradually over time. To the contrary, after a public announcement in Ben-Porath and
Kahneman (1996 and 2003), all players can immediately punish any deviator. In mod-
els, in which communication, observations and the repeated games played are bilateral,
punishment is also immediate. In Renault and Tomala (1998), play is interrupted until
all players know who has cheated. Simultaneously, the payo⁄ accumulation stops, which
is unimportant since the repeated game is undiscounted. In the repeated network game,
the impatient players￿ except of the deviator￿ may su⁄er from the delay, during which
punishment is less e⁄ective than in a complete network. The diameter of the network
captures this delay and determines together with the discount factor whether a strategy
pro￿le is a sequential equilibrium. This result extends to cases where the players can lie
but truthtelling prevails in equilibrium. Other assumptions may also be responsible for
the di⁄erent outcomes. In particular, a deeper analysis of the matrices that contain the
distinct networks might yield interesting results.17
6 Final Remarks
6.1 Mixed Actions
The extension of the Folk Theorem to mixed actions is straightforward in the complete
network. Additionally, a player￿ s deviation within the support of his mixed action, which
16Though a network formation game might precede the repeated network game, this setup can be easily
extended to explicitly take into account incentives to form or maintain links since comparative statics on
the topology of the network are straightforward, as mentioned in subsection 5.2.
17Network g can be expressed in a symmetric matrix which is of dimension n ￿ n (see footnote 1).
Similar matrices can be generated for the other models.
25is not observed by the other players, must be prevented. FLT achieve this in the complete
network setting by making future play dependent on the realized action pro￿le today. By
letting a high payo⁄today follow a low one tomorrow, and vice versa, FLT can make each
player exactly indi⁄erent among all pure actions in the support of a mixed one.18
The Folk Theorem for the repeated network game can be extended to mixed actions
using FLT￿ s idea. A player who is punished would be forced to his e⁄ective minmax
payo⁄ in mixed actions￿ apart from the punishment, mixed actions need not be used.
After the number of periods equivalent to the diameter of the network has passed, every
player knows the pure action pro￿le generated by the mixed action in the ￿rst punishment
period. Punishment continues, anyway, at least until this period, and then, FLT￿ s strategy
can be used to compensate the players for their choices in the ￿rst punishment period.
Thereafter, the second punishment period is compensated, and so on. This process stops
in ￿nite time. The main advantage of this extension is that a larger set of payo⁄ vectors
can be sustained by sequential equilibria. However, patient players can achieve ￿rst best
outcomes already with pure actions.
6.2 Conclusion
In this paper, delayed perfect monitoring in an in￿nitely repeated discounted game is
modelled by allocating the players to a connected (and undirected) network. The Folk
Theorem obtains since patient players do not mind to receive the repeated game￿ s history
gradually over time. Truthtelling can be achieved endogenously only under certain con-
ditions, due to the bilateral communication structure and the less than full-dimensional
payo⁄ space. For impatient players the network may make a di⁄erence which need not
be big, as shown for the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma. The interplay between the diameter of the
network and the patience of the players leads to the reduction in the set of sequential
equilibria. This paper also contributes to the network literature, which so far emphasized
the importance of the clustering coe¢ cient for cooperation to be sustainable in a network.
As already mentioned in the introduction, this setup can be applied to various speci￿c
contexts. Not only companies, but also impatient people form networks and interact
strategically over time, such as within a company, in any other organization, or in society
at large. As long as all of them are on the same hierarchical level, this model applies. Also
macroeconomic applications can be thought of. The players in a network thus might be all
18The main di¢ culty arises for players with positively and negatively related payo⁄ functions since
their payo⁄ space is a line. Since it is only possible to move "up" and "down" the line in the future, it
is non-trivial to de￿ne a continuation strategy which makes each player indi⁄erent among the support of
the mixed action. However, FLT construct a strategy pro￿le which achieves this task in ￿nite time.
26the companies in an economy and a deviation could be interpreted as one of them going
bankrupt.19 The network e⁄ects in repeated strategic interaction can also be observed
in ￿nancial markets. For example, innovative ￿nancial strategies, such as those used by
hedge funds, spread throughout a network over time. Whereas at the beginning only few
players use a certain strategy, over time everyone adopts a successful one.
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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1
Given G and g; ￿x x 2 F￿ and note that x; as well as any other payo⁄vector in co(G); is
feasible when ￿ 2 (1 ￿ 1
z;1); where z is the number of vertices of co(G)￿ see subsection
2.4.2. Hence, let _ ￿ = maxf~ ￿;1 ￿ 1
zg; where ~ ￿ < 1 is determined below. Then, for each
￿ 2 (_ ￿;1); there is a corresponding sequence of pure action pro￿les fasg1
s=1 which yields
x: When ￿ changes, the sequence of action pro￿les that generates x may di⁄er. Hence,
strategy pro￿le ~ f 2 F; which thereafter is de￿ned and shown to be a sequential equilibrium
of Gg;￿ for any ￿ 2 (_ ￿;1); may prescribe a di⁄erent sequence of action pro￿les for each ￿;
although its structure is unchanged. For any j 2 I; de￿ne ~ fj 2 Fj as follows:
~ f1
j = a1









j; unless there is 1 ￿ t0 < t such that for ^ at0 2 ob
t￿1
j ; ^ at0
i 6= at0
i ; while ^ at0
￿i = at0
￿i:
In this case, switch to phase 2 at t0 + dj and let ~ as
j = as
j; for all s ￿ 1:
282) ~ at
j; if t0 + dj ￿ t < t0 + d; unless player l; where l 6= i and l = 2 Su if i 2 Su;
deviates at any t00; where t0 + d > t00 > t0: Then, restart phase 2, set t0 = t00
and choose ~ as
j accordingly. Otherwise, switch to phase 3 at t0 + d:
3) ￿ ai
j; if t0 + d ￿ t ￿ t0 + T; where T is determined below. If any player l devi-
ates at any ￿ t; where t0 + T ￿ ￿ t ￿ t0 + d; restart phase 2, set t0 = ￿ t and choose
~ as
j accordingly. Otherwise, switch to phase 4 at t0 + T + 1:
4) cs
j; if t ￿ t0 + T + s; where fcsg1
s=1 is the sequence of action pro￿les that yields
either !i if i = 2 S; or !Su if i 2 Su: If any player l deviates at any ￿ > t0 + T; re-
start phase 2, set t0 = ￿ and choose ~ as
j accordingly. If l = i or i;l 2 Su; restart
fcsg1
s=1 where it was truncated by l￿ s deviation, once phase 4 is reached again.
Phase 2 corresponds to the ISP; phase 3 to the e⁄ective minmax punishment of the last
deviator, and phase 4 to the punishment reward phase. After any subsequent unilateral
deviation, the phase in which the game is at the time of the deviation prescribes the play
of the following d ￿ 1 periods￿ in general, phase 2 is restarted. Then, the new deviator
is punished. In case, the same player deviates again in phase 2 (and no other one does),
however, this phase is not restarted, but his punishment begins d periods after his ￿rst
deviation. His entire gain is eliminated by forcing him to his e⁄ective minmax payo⁄ for
at least d ￿ 1 periods, or longer, if necessary. After d ￿ 1 punishment periods, all players
know if he deviated again in the period before it started, and hence, for how long it has to
last in order to eliminate his entire gain. A similar argument applies for several unilateral
deviations by distinct players of an EU-group during phase 2. After punishing the initial
deviator for at least d ￿ 1 periods, the gain of the subsequent one(s) is eliminated.
By construction, the players can ignore multilateral deviations from ~ f; and it remains
to show that no player￿ s unilateral deviation from ~ f is ever pro￿table for large enough ￿:
The Folk Theorem holds trivially when at is a stage game Nash Equilibrium for all t; and
hereafter, only strategy pro￿les that do not generate such sequences of action pro￿les are
considered. Finally, a consistent system of beliefs, given ~ f; is speci￿ed in footnote 11.
The proof is organized as follows. The result for phase 2 is shown ￿rst since it intro-
duces arguments used thereafter to prove the results of phases 4, 1 and 3. Note, that the
following 6 combinations of players￿deviations have to be shown to be unpro￿table; for
the ￿rst four i ￿ j holds, whereas for the remaining two i ￿ j holds: i 6= j and either
i;j = 2 S; or i 2 S; but j = 2 S; or j 2 S; but i = 2 S; or i 2 Su; j 2 Su0 such that u 6= u0; and
￿nally, i;j 2 Su; or i = j: For each phase, the proof proceeds in this order.
29PHASE 2
Figure 6 illustrates the order of time periods in phase 2. Suppose player i = 2 S deviated
at t0: During the ISP player j 6= i; j = 2 S; receives ISP t0
j : By deviating at t00; where
t0 < t00 < t0 + d; he can maximally gain bj = maxa2A[max￿ aj2Aj hj(￿ aj;a￿j) ￿ hj(a)]; since
his remaining ISP-payo⁄is unchanged. However, from period t00+d on, he is forced to his
e⁄ective minmax payo⁄of 0, and then, his punishment reward phase is played. Player j￿ s
deviation at t00 is not pro￿table when for some positive integer ^ T2; where t00 +d ￿ t0 + ^ T2;
(1 ￿ ￿)bj + ￿
^ T2!
j
j ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
t0+ ^ T2 P
t=t00+d
￿




(1 ￿ ￿)bj ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
t0+ ^ T2 P
t=t00+d
￿














^ T2 holds for all ￿ < 1:) Hence, (5) implies (4) and it su¢ ces to show (5).
(1 ￿ ￿)bj ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
t0+ ^ T2 P
t=t00+d
￿





As ￿ converges to 1, (5) is ful￿lled: its left-hand-side converges to zero whereas its right-
hand-side is strictly positive since !i
j > !
j
j: This may hold for several distinct pairs of
discount factor and strictly positive integer. (The last inequality is ful￿lled trivially when
player j￿ s gain from punishing player i is larger than bj:) An analogous argument holds,
whenever i ￿ j: The case t00 +d > t0 + ^ T2 is simpler since the sum on the left-hand-side of
(5) drops out as well as j￿ s payo⁄ in the ￿rst period(s) of i￿ s punishment reward phase,
which for ￿ close to 1 is negligible.
For i;j 2 Su; after player j￿ s deviation at any t00; where t0 < t00 < t0+d; the ISP about
i￿ s deviation continues. Once all players know about i￿ s deviation, ￿ ai is played for at least
d￿1 periods, that is, at least until period t0+2d￿2: Then, ￿ aj ￿ ￿ ai is played until period
t0 + _ T2; to take away player j￿ s gain from deviating at t00: Since j￿ s punishment lasts at
least one period, _ T2 > 2d ￿ 2: Thereafter, the EU-group￿ s punishment reward phase is
played. Player j￿ s deviation at t00 is not pro￿table, if for some positive integer _ T2 > 2d￿2;


































t’ + T2+ 1 ^
player L·s punish-
ment reward starts
t’’ + T2 + 1 ^
player M·s punish-
ment reward starts







againsti ˛ Su starts
t’ + 2d - 1
t’ + 2d - 1
punishment re-
ward of Su starts
punishment
against j ˛ Su starts
t’ + T2 + 1
.
punishment re-
ward of Su starts
Figure 6: Order of time periods in phase 2
When ￿ converges to 1, the right-hand-side converges to ( _ T2 ￿ 2d + 2)!
Su
j > 0; by
l￿ Hospital. Since bj is a ￿xed positive number, the inequality is ful￿lled for a large enough
_ T2: A similar argument applies when several distinct players with equivalent utility to i￿ s
deviate sequentially during the ISP about i￿ s deviation or when i = j; that is, one player
deviates in several (subsequent) periods. Finally, select a large enough, strictly positive
integer T2 such that no player can deviate pro￿tably in phase 2.
PHASE 4 and PHASE 1
The result for phase 4 is stated ￿rst since it implies the result for phase 1. Suppose that
player i 6= j; that i;j = 2 S; and that i is the last deviator. Player j does not deviate at ￿;
the ￿rst period of i￿ s punishment reward phase, if for some positive integer ^ T4;
(1 ￿ ￿)maxaj2Aj hj(aj;c1






(1 ￿ ￿)maxaj2Aj hj(aj;c1






When ￿ converges to 1, the left-hand-side of the last inequality converges to zero
whereas the right-hand-side is strictly positive (since !i
j > !
j
j; and for any ￿ < 1; ￿
^ T4 < 1):
The same argument holds whenever i ￿ j; and when player j deviates in any other than
the ￿rst period of player i￿ s punishment reward phase since for ￿ close to 1, the payo⁄
obtained at the beginning of any punishment reward phase is negligible.
31If i = j; player i cannot deviate pro￿tably in the ^ ￿th period of his own punishment
reward phase, if there is a positive integer _ T4 such that




s=^ ￿+1 ￿ !i
ij1
s=^ ￿+1 < 0;
where ￿ ￿ t0 + _ T4 + ^ ￿ and !i
ij1
s=^ ￿+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
P1
s=^ ￿+1 ￿
s￿1hi(cs): This simpli￿es to
(1 ￿ ￿)bi + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)ISP ￿
i < !i
ij1










s=^ ￿+1 : (6)
When ￿ converges to 1, the left-hand-side of (6) is bounded above by a positive
number and the right-hand-side, by l￿ Hospital, converges to _ T4!i
ij1
s=^ ￿+1 > 0: (Although,
!i
ij1
s=^ ￿+1 di⁄ers from !i
i; for ￿ close to 1, this di⁄erence is negligible and !i
ij1
s=^ ￿+1 has the
same properties as !i
i:) For _ T4 large enough, (6) holds. A similar argument applies when
i;j 2 Su; and j deviates in the punishment reward phase of his EU-group. This argument
together with the one used in phase 2 above demonstrates that any player￿ s unilateral
deviation of ￿nite length is neither pro￿table in phase 4. Finally, let T4 be the smallest
positive integer such that no player can deviate pro￿tably in phase 4.
The result of phase 4 extends to phase 1 since by assumption any player￿ s target
payo⁄ is strictly larger than his punishment reward payo⁄. Moreover, neither ￿nite
deviations by one player nor subsequent deviations by distinct players in an EU-group
are pro￿table in phase 1. Hence, also for phase 1 there is a discount factor ￿ < 1 and a
positive integers T1 such that no player can deviate pro￿tably from strategy pro￿le ~ f:
PHASE 3
Suppose player i is forced to his e⁄ective minmax payo⁄ because he deviated at t0: By
de￿nition, neither player i nor any player j ￿ i can deviate pro￿tably in this phase.
Hence, suppose i;j = 2 S: Player j does not deviate at any ￿ t; where t0 + d ￿ ￿ t ￿ t0 + T3; if









t￿￿ thj(￿ ai) ￿ ￿
t0+T3￿￿ t!i
j < 0;
(1 ￿ ￿)bj + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)ISP
￿ t










32Proceeding as in phase 2, that is, substituting on (7)￿ s right-hand-side ￿
t0+T3￿￿ t
with ￿
T3 (for any ￿ < 1; ￿
T3￿(￿ t￿t0) > ￿
T3 since ￿ t > t0) and taking the limit of ￿
converging to 1, ful￿lls (7) for at least one pair of discount factor ￿ < 1 and strictly
positive integer T3: An analogous argument holds for deviations, or a sequence of de-
viations, by EU- and NEU-players. Choose T3 large enough to prevent any such deviation.
Let T = maxfT1;T2;T3;T4g; and let ~ ￿ be the lowest discount factor, for which,
given T; no player can deviate pro￿tably in any phase. (If there are several pairs of T
and ￿ for which the proof holds, the pair with the lowest discount factor is selected.)
Finally, let _ ￿ = maxf~ ￿;1 ￿ 1
zg: Then, for any ￿ 2 (_ ￿;1); ~ f is a sequential equilibrium
strategy pro￿le of Gg;￿ and H￿( ~ f) = x:
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 1
Fix G; ￿ < 1 and g: Select ￿ f 2 SE(G￿) that generates the sequence of action pro￿les
fat( ￿ f)g1
t=1 ￿ f_ atg1
t=1: Take a strategy pro￿le with the same structure as ~ f; de￿ned in
Theorem 1, to support this sequence of action pro￿les as a sequential equilibrium of Gg;￿:
Then, the network has an impact with respect to ~ f if some player can deviate pro￿tably.





t￿￿ maxai2Ai hi(ai; _ at
￿i) + ￿
T!i








t￿￿[maxai2Ai hi(ai; _ at







Subtracting (1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿
T!i




i(T): The network has an
impact with respect to ~ f if either the last inequality holds for some i = 2 S or an analogous
condition for some i 2 S: In the second case, !i
i is substituted with !
Su
i :
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